Wednesday, April 13, 2011
Contents
Contents
Executive summary
SECTION 1: Developmend and the Environment in India
BY: Graham Salinger
SECTION 2: The Rise of India’s Middle Class
BY: Mateo Rebecchi
SECTION 3: Intercultural Relations and Immigration: The Case of Tibetan Refugees
BY: Noah Wallis
SECTION 4: India- Regional Power and ASEAN
Executive Summary
India with one of the fastest growing economies in the world and one of the greatest sources of human capital, embraced the 21st century with hope of further development that would improve the lives of their over 1 billion inhabitants. This pursuit has seen great strides in many sectors and has increased India’s importance in regional and global affairs. However, like all nations who have sought greater development, such ambitions have been met with domestic and international challenges. This paper takes a look at a few challenges that have emerged in India.
We begin with a discussion of India’s rising middle class and its impact on the rest of Indian society. Mateo Rebecchi argues that the middle class has emerged as a result of liberalized economic policies that have increased wealth disparity within India. In this way, economic development has challenged India to address emerging income gap issues and class conflicts that has resulted.
Another challenge that has emerged as a result of increased development in India is increased environmental problems. Such environmental issues are the subject of our second chapter. In chapter two Graham Salinger discusses the role that India sees itself in addressing global climate change while development remains a top priority. This chapter begins with a discussion of India’s environmental challenges and highlights some recent policies that the Indian government has undertaken to address such issues. This chapter concludes by putting India’s efforts in the context of global efforts to combat global climate change but points out that India remains resistant to address such issues at the cost of further development.
In chapter three Noah Wallis discusses the challenges that India faces in absorbing refugees from neighboring countries. He does so through the examination of challenges that Tibetan refugees face in Indian society and connects their narrative to the larger Indian story of tolerance and secular inclusiveness. This chapter discusses the theme of diversity in Indian society and the challenges to preserving such diversity. As the chapter highlights, India is the largest and most pluralistic democracy in the world which contains a rich diversity of religions, ethnicities and languages. Diversity in India has been an important characteristic of the state since its independence in 1947. As a concept, diversity, is widely appreciated and respected, however, one can perceive tensions increasing based on recent immigration into India from neighboring countries. One group facing the uncertainty of attitude towards recent immigration to India are Tibetan refugees— refugees who fled Tibet following the fleet of the Dalai Lama in October of 1959. Even as Tibetan refugees immigrated decades ago, their non-Hindu identity may become a factor as xenophobia and immigration concerns rise in India.
In our final chapter Brad Fichter discusses the future of India –ASEAN relations within the context of India’s emerging role in the Southern Asian region. This chapter argues that Indian engagement in Southeast Asian regional associations is not a deliberate attempt to balance China’s regional power but rather an attempt to address shared regional challenges including piracy, international terrorism, and humanitarian assistance capabilities. In this way, our final chapter builds on the domestic socioeconomic challenges that India faces as a developing country that have been discussed and looks at India’s regional strategic relations as it relates to addressing shared challenges and policy goals.
Hot Topic: India Works on Developing In The Midst of The Global Climate Change Battle
Introduction
Driving through India the problem presents itself immediately. The beauty of the land disappears into a manmade fog, the ancient history hides itself as it loses itself in haze. While visitors come to see the Taj Mahal and perhaps to party in Goa, the development boom in India that helped to bring in tourists, has become an environmental disaster waiting to happen. The cities are overcrowded with people and animals which contribute to India’s growing climate problems (Food and Agricultural Association of the United Nations, 2010 pg 1). The water is undrinkable and the air, dense with pollution, creates a smell that over powers the smell of spices that visitors would hope to encounter on their journey to India. Trash lines the streets where a great civilization was created. For years, India, with a population of over a billion people, prioritized development over the environment , but with the world coming to terms with global climate change India could not ignore the issue any longer. In March of 2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh agreed to a strategic partnership which included measures to help India develop cleaner and more efficient energy ( President Bush,2006, pg382). In May of that year, realizing that if India wanted to open itself up to the 21st century it would have to deal with one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century, India put forth a National Environmental Policy (Government of India Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2006, pg1). This paper seeks to examine the policies outlined in the National Environmental Policy and will look at how such policies have been implemented, further more it will examine India’s role in the international community in dealing with climate change. I begin with a brief overview of some of the climate change issues that India faces, from there I look at a number of policies that India has undertaken to deal with the environmental issues it faces. I conclude with a discussion of India’s role in the international climate change talks and I re-examine the balance between Indian development and environmental impact.
The Environmental Challenge
India is one of the most crowded nations and population control measures that were instituted in 2000 have not been successful (Mahapatra, 2008, p.1) Population density has exacerbated pollution problems that are natural consequence of industrialization, principally through vehicle traffic. It is estimated that at least 73 million Indians drive (Office of the Prime Minister of India, 2008, 69) In 2003 the government outlined an Auto Fuel Policy to address issues of emission standards through the use of new technologies that would help India reach European standards (Niak, 2003, p 3). The government has credited such emission standard along with other components of the policy such as banning old vehicles with bringing NO2 within government standards, however levels of other green house gases are still high do in part to the increased amount of drivers and other factors that contribute to climate change (Central Pollution Control Board, 2008, p1)
Another big factor that contributes to India’s pollution problems is its reliance on coal for energy. While India has started investing in cleaner technologies and alternative sources of energy, coal supplies 66 percent of their energy and according to government estimates will continue to until 2032(Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2009, p 123). The effects of pollution on India threaten many national initiatives that it has had in place for years because it causes water and food security issues and increases health risks which creates the possibility of setting India back in terms of long term national efforts to increase living standards (Office of the Prime Minister of India, 2008, pg 72). Having said that, climate change policy is secondary to India’s push towards development.
Here we see a paradox within India’s climate change policies, it is facing international pressure to reduce its environmental footprint at a time in which its development requires a reliance on energy and an increase in industrial output. In this way, India has to find a balance between its national developmental priority and global priorities. While India’s relationship with the United States has forced India to take on a bigger role in fighting climate change, India has often been at odds with the developed world with respect to how much of a regulatory burden it should put on industries that support its economy.
Policy
Shortly after agreeing to a strategic relationship with the United States in 2006, India revealed its National Environmental Policy. The policy outlined several steps that India is willing to take in order to reduce its impact on global climate change, including regulations that would make polluters pay for polluting, the adoption of new technologies including hydropower, improvement of national transport systems and the adoption of safer energy sources such as bio-fuels (Government of India Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2006. Pg 11-46). Perhaps the biggest contribution that the policy made was that it gave municipalities greater responsibility for identifying environmental problems and addressing them (Government of India Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2006, pg17). This has lead to an incremental approach to solving India’s problems in which certain areas address area specific problems and the government uses lessons from these policy outcomes to help adopt stronger national policies.
This method was used in the creation of eco-cities in which select cities were supposed to conduct site specific projects to set a national example of sustainable development (Comptroller and Auditor General 2010, pg 65). According to the most recent audit report conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor General, these eco-cities failed to complete their projects and achieve their policy goals; this was primarily due to funding shortfalls (Comptroller and Auditor General 2010, pg 65). A similar strategy was undertaken in a 2010 study conducted by the Central Pollution Control Board, India’s regulatory agency that deals with pollution. The study looked at pollution patterns in six major cities in order to discern the primary sources of pollution. The study showed that nitric oxide remains an emerging pollutant and that the primary sources of pollution remain vehicles, cow waste, and industry (Gautum, 2010, pg 1-192). The study reiterated many solutions that were suggested by the Auto Fuel Plan and have been stressed by numerous commitments that India has made over the years, including introducing cleaner fuel into the markets, forcing industries to use cleaner technologies and the promotion of public transportation (Gautum, 2010, pg 1-192). The report also stresses that monitoring pollution can only demonstrate the extent to which a problem exists but that once these problems are identified the government needs to do a better job of addressing ways in which to deal with pollution (Gautum, 2010, pg 74).
While India monitors levels of green house gasses throughout the country, little has been done to address problems once they have been detected because the government has failed to clearly define emission standards and regulate industries. One way in which India has attempted to control pollution and establish standards is through a system in which it monitors industrial clusters and rates them based on data related to how much the area pollutes, areas with scores above 70 are considered “critically polluted” and they are required to develop roadmaps for reducing emissions (Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2009, 115). In the latest Annual Report conducted by the Minister of Environment and Forestry 43 industrial clusters were identified as “critically polluted” and only a few areas, including Delhi, have drawn up plans to deal with pollution (Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2009, 117). Another way in which the government has attempted to regulate pollution is through the Charter on Corporate Responsibility for Environmental Protection which sets emission targets for many industries and requires that they implement plans to meet those targets (Central Pollution Control Board, 2003, pg1-37)
In addition to its outline of policy initiatives and its focus on decentralizing environmental policy, India’s National Environmental Policy of 2006 stresses the role that India sees itself and other developing countries playing in the global climate change battle. Several times the policy stressed that while India will take on the domestic policies as outlined, its national priority is development and poverty elevation (Government of India Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2006, pg 10). While the policy began with a commitment to international climate change efforts, it emphasized that developed countries must recognize the right of India to develop and that international agreements must not get in the way of India’s ability to develop (Government of India Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2006, pg 10).This is largely constant with India’s increased role in global climate talks in the last few years.
India’s Global Role
India, which is a party to the Kyoto Protocol and has regional alliances through the Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the India-China Partnership on Combating Climate Change, has consistently operated on the global stage from the framework that it will continue to industrialize but that it will seek out best practices to reduce pollution (Government of India 2009, pg1). The Kyoto protocol is a key component of India’s role in the international community in that it states that developing nations are not required to redirect resources from other initiatives to climate change projects, it also allows developing countries to engage in cap in trade policies and requires developed countries to help developing countries adopt cleaner technology (Office of The Prime Minister of India 2008, pg 47). A year after forming its strategic relationship with the United States and putting forth its National Environmental Policy, India met with 190 other countries, including its regional rival China that has been historically opposed to long-term discussions on climate change (The Economist,2007, pg 1). These discussions lead to the “Bali Roadmap”, an international agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions by having developed countries reduce emissions by 40 percent by 2020 and emphasizing the need for the international community to assist developing countries in plans to reduce emissions (The Economist Table, 2007, pg 1).
Following the establishment of the roadmap, India announced its “National Action Plan on Climate Change”. The plan called for several policy priorities including using solar energy in urban areas and in industries, using tax breaks to promote energy efficiency in the energy sector which is vital to India’s economy but accounts for 31 percent of its total carbon emissions, instituting building codes and training builders so that buildings can be more energy efficient, and improving public transportation which could reduce carbon emissions by 433 million tons by 20311(Office of The Prime Minister of India, 2008, pg 1-52). The international community met again in 2009 to advance plans to reduce carbon emissions, prior to the meeting Indian Prime Minister Singh reaffirmed that India can’t afford to adopt policies that may hurt its overall development stating that it would not adopt targets for reducing green house gasses but that it would try to make sure that per capita emission didn’t surpass the average in the developed world (Singh, 2009, pg 1-12). This became a sticking point in the discussions and India aligned itself with other developing countries to make sure that no regulations would be passed that would be inconsistent with their development priorities. As a result a compromise was between the developing nations including India and China and the developed world (Vidal and Watts, 2009, pg 1). As a result the international community reaffirmed its commitment to assisting developing countries, however the goal of reducing emissions by 80 percent by 2050 was abandoned and no new targets were established (Vidal and Watts, 2009, pg 1).
Despite its role in disrupting the international communities goals and despite the fact that the developed nations were unable to meet their financial commitments, India remained committed to the Kyoto Protocol and has reaffirmed its policy initiatives (Goldenberg, 2010 pg 1). In 2010 India announced a number of new steps that it would take to advance previously established policies including steps to plant trees that it predicts would reduce the amount of carbon in the environment by 43 million tons annually, plans to tax coal companies, plans to generate 20,000 megawatts of solar power by 2022 and plans to implement emission buying credit systems in 700 Industries (Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2010, pg 1-7) India has also promised to release statistics on its green house gas emissions every two years (Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2010, pg 1-7). Some statistics have already pointed to the possible successes of Indian policy. According to five studies conducted in 2009, India’s per capita green house gas emissions are expected to fall below that of developed nations by 2020 (Ramesh, 2009, pg 1). While the international community will be tracking such progress closely, such expectations give India the hope that it can continue to develop while limiting its environmental impact.
Conclusion
India is in a tough position when it comes to climate change. It is understandable that it has other policy priorities such as dealing with poverty and health and it makes sense that it would focus significant efforts on development. Furthermore, it has regional conflicts with China and Pakistan, which have also been prioritized by the international community. Just as India has made significant strides in education, women’s rights, poverty reduction, and breaking long standing socio-economic bearers imposed by the cast system, developed countries, which flourished on the backs of industrialization, have told India that it needs to make sacrifices in order to reduce global climate change. While India may lack some of the resources and capital to implement all of the policies outlined in this paper and while it has a long way to go in dealing with domestic climate issues, human capital has become a force in changing Indian society and India would do well to use such entrepreneurial instincts to advance efforts in dealing with climate change. While the Indian government may see the international efforts on climate change to be a burden on its economic success it also provides India, with its comparative advantage in the knowledge economy, an opportunity to embrace global priorities by becoming the face of green technological innovation. Developed nations are hungry for innovation in the green technology sector and they see such a sector as instrumental to economic growth. While the manufacturing of such products may go to China, this still provides India with the opportunity to lead the world towards greener pastures.
India’s New Middle Class: Coming of Age in a Globally Liberalized Economy
Introduction
The growing visibility of India’s middle class has become increasingly harder to ignore over the years. To date there is no official definition of the middle class in India. India’s middle class not only categorizes an income group, but also a political and social class and a consumer market. Although it comprises less than 30 percent of the overall population, approximately 300 million people (Deutch 1-4), and the middle class has spread wide scale socioeconomic changes throughout India’s small towns and cities as it is the fast growing segment of the population. This growing middle class has become the symbol for development in India today. New middle class communities have popped across the country along with new businesses to satisfy the consuming patterns of this growing class (Fernandes “India’s New” xiv). The sales growth of consumer goods such as televisions and mobile phones to the middle class has already been established, but a new range of products such as financial services is increasingly being geared towards this group as well. India’s upwardly mobalizing business class has not only gained national attention, but transnational attention as well from economists and political scientists alike. Transnational views for the most part perceive the increasing middle class as an opportunity to capture new consumer markets; for others, such as European countries and the U.S., the increasing educated work force potentially threatens their middle class because of outsourcing that occurs in service sector jobs (Fernandes “India’s New” xiv). Moreover, there is serious concern within India itself amongst those on the fringes of the middle class and the impoverished who are worried that they have been left behind and forgotten in this surge of socioeconomic mobility.
This essay will analyze the rise of the India’s middle class the role of a liberalized economy, its perceived culture, politics, and its positive and negative outcomes for those included as well as excluded in this class of people. In order to determine the relevance and implications of India’s rising middle class on a larger scale it is imperative to understand all of its intricacies.
Liberalizing India: Creating a New Middle Class
To further understand the implications and consequences of India’s rising middle class on national and transnational level, it is important to understand the policies and culture that have spawned this new middle class. India’s new middle class has its roots in the political economic policies of liberalization. India’s economic liberalization began in the early 1990’s, with deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and reduced controls on foreign trade and investment. Disenchantment with early socialist ideals of the state can be traced to the post emergency era of the 1970s (Bowond 44-46). The task of the planning commission was minimized during the 1980s, when national expressions emphasized the efficiency logic of private sector-led urban development (Bowond 44-46). The emphasis has now moved to a decentralized approach that advocates local economic progress and privatization instead of distributive justice and balanced regional development. The liberalization of India’s economy has opened up its national markets to global competition which in turn has benefitted India. Since adopting liberal economic policies India’s economy has experienced a seven percent economic growth following 1997 (CIA 1). Despite its economic growth India has experienced a widening gap in its inequality.
Compared to other developing countries, India’s Gini coefficient, which measures inequality amongst populations, is relatively low. India’s Gini coefficient falls just under thirty five, but it has been gradually increasing since liberalizing its economy (Deutch 1-4). Many of those in favor of liberalization will often times report that it reduces poverty and although this may be true to a certain extent, the Gini coefficient has measured growth in the gap between India’s rich and poor in tandem with growth within the classes themselves. Thus, although the poverty level in India has been on the decline following economic liberalization, the rich continue to get richer in comparison. Therefore the middle class, or the “new rich” of India, largely supports and promotes the liberalized culture that has given it birth. In past economic transitions those who stand to benefit the most from liberalization are them members of the middle class sector of an economy. In turn, many businesses stand to benefit from this rising middle class’s purchasing power.
Money Talks: The Purchasing Power of India’s Middle Class
Following the liberalization of its economy India has witnessed a range of images that have depicted the changing practices of consumers due to the newfound wealth of its latest liberalized middle class (Fernandes 2421-2432). Entrepreneurs and business men are now the popular public figures that Indians aspire to emulate. The immergence of this new class is similar to the emergence of the bourgeoisie following the industrialization of Europe; even if India is not yet seen as an industrialized country, the emergence of this middle class can be seen as hopeful for those who fear that unindustrialized nations will be left behind in the progression of globalization. As India’s middle class rises in status its consumption habits for material goods are changing with their increased incomes. In accordance with simple economic principles, as an individual’s income increases so does the amount of luxury goods that he or she will consume. This phenomenon is occurring everyday amongst India’s middle class. Currently, discretionary spending in India accounts for 52 percent of overall private spending, but by 2025 discretionary spending of India’s middle class is expected to account for 70 percent of private spending (Mkinsey 4). Even though India’s 2025 projected consumer market has not yet arrived, both domestic and multinational companies have their work cut out for them. It is most certain that those incumbent businesses already supplying discretionary goods demanded by India’s middle class hold the upper hand in this future market, but they too face challenges to meet the changing trends and demands of the rising middle class if they look to prosper in the future (Mkinsey 2).
The middle class in India not only covers an income group, but also a political, social and consumer culture (Deutch 1-4). It is this middle class that is rapidly accelerating the changing landscapes of traditional India and replacing them with modern malls and fast food joints. India is witnessing a rapid change in its consumerism as the demands for more luxury goods are made available through its liberalized economy. Prior to liberalizing its economy many foreign goods were only available to upper class Indians who were able to import goods from nearby countries by means of relatives or by going to other countries to purchase western goods (Fernandes “Nationalizing” 614). As Leela Fernandes states, “this transformation in the political culture of India has suggested in a way the re-imagined Indian nation in the context of globalization” (“Nationalizing” 614). Attitudes of spending are undergoing transformation as well. Where the traditionally Asian families have stressed the importance of saving, today the attitudes of young Indian consumers, inspired by job security and comfortable wages, are to spend. Being more enthusiastic to spend has also led India’s middle class to take on more debt. Credit card users have exploded in the last five years from 6 million in 2005 to 28 million in 2009 (Deucth 1-4). As luxury spending habits of the middle class continue to increase, those who are not considered middle class are being overlooked and not just in their purchasing power, but human rights.
India’s IT Sector: Boom for the Middle Class, Bust for the Lower Class
The development of India’s service sector has also been of focus and often times seen as the main factor for increased economic growth since the 1990’s. The demand for white collar jobs and the expansion of the service sector has directly been linked to the expansion of India’s middle class. It is because of this of this direct correlation that those who are considered middle class in India’s economy today are largely classified as such because of their occupation, as opposed to the past where working in an industrialized job classified you as middle class. Today those middle class working in the high tech industries have become important symbols of India’s newfound success in the global economy (Mukherjee 2-32). It has indeed proven to be a very promising sector for India’s middle class who have seen an increase in new jobs in information technology for every year following 1999. Between 2002 and 2003 in the IT sector there was a twenty four percent growth (Fernandes 2421-32). Salaries have also continued to increase considerably in white-collar jobs. As the salaries and demand for IT workers increase so does the desire for a college education, which many of India’s middle class contain. For some this increase of middle class workers in the IT sector is believed to be attributing to the uneven distribution of wealth in India’s economy, particularly in those areas where IT development is strongest. As well as contributing to a corporate elitist culture that is further discriminating against the impoverished.
In research published by Dr. Sanjukta Mukherjee entitled, The Bangalore Brand: Uneven geographies of India’s hi-tech boom, Dr. Mukherjee draws the connections between the Bangalore’s IT cooperate sector and its favor of liberalized economic growth models as the main cause of the “increasing social gap between the rich and the poor” (Mukherjee 2-32). Bangalore is to India what the Silicone valley is to California. It is India’s largest IT exporter and is its fastest growing metropolis. Due to these facts Bangalore is the ideal location to study the impacts of a liberalized IT sector on the middle class and those on the fringes of it.
In the process of globalization the neoliberal market creates competition amongst cities worldwide for the label of global cities in order to attract capital (Mukherjee 2-32). The Indian government, along with IT elitist/middle class, has participated in advancing Bangalore’s status to a global city, but they have done so at the cost of the lower class. Ignoring the socioeconomic improvement of the city, the government has instead decided to place more emphasis on the economic growth of its IT sector and the needs of it growing middle class that drive its growth. As result of this agenda when decisions for growth are made they are often times undemocratic, because usually those making the decision are outside parties such as think tanks that have local ties to the IT sectors allowing them to call the shots alongside local politicians (Mukherjee 2-32). This atmosphere creates for unequal distributions of political and economic power. It could be argued that increased investment solely in Bangalore’s dominating IT sector in return would yield more profits to the area as a whole, due to tourism and increased flow of capital from the IT middle class into the hands of the lower class merchants. One could make a very convincing argument using this approach, but still there are those individuals who would never even reap these benefits because of physical displacement from Bangalore.
The Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), a state sponsored program whose mission is to modernize and improve upon the city’s infrastructure, has reverted to forms of urban renewal projects. BATF is led by Nandan Nilekani, CEO of Infosys, and its affiliates are comprised of other IT companies. Like many of the urban renewal projects in India and elsewhere around the world, it is often times the impoverished areas that are home to the lower class that get demolished for modernization projects. In the case of BATF the creation of a golf course for the IT employees and business associates and a private airport took the place of local farmers who were forced to relocate from their land. Even though money had been granted to the farmers for their land, it was only enough to sustain them temporarily, forcing them out into the streets to find other ways of producing income (Mukherjee 2-32). BATF’s other “improvements” in the attempts of modernizing Bangalore have included the clearing of beggars, squatters and unauthorized vendors from certain districts of the city without addressing the issues these have caused, ignoring these inconveniences to their vision of modernity. For its efforts BATF receives recognition, as well as funds, from the World Bank as a leading example of private and public sector collaboration in the development of cities. The WB has throughout the years been a major influence on infrastructural provisions, which have redirected the Indian government’s interest away from the issues of welfare, class equity, and basic needs of its people. This mode of development is common among economically liberalized countries who seek funding from the WB. The politics at play in the development planning and agenda for India are very much influenced by economic liberal ideologies as well.
Political Perceptions and Impressions of India’s Middle Class
As the middle class creates its own niche in India’s political sphere, it has along the way developed an anti - poor, anti - working class sentiment. Much of this frustration towards the working class originates from the middle class’ disillusionment with India’s political system, which they feel is more concerned with issues of the working class and poor ( Fernandes 2421-32) . It is this anger due to the unrepresented interest of the middle class that is at the core of the political outrage. In addition India’s middle class resents what they see as gratuitous state support for the working class and the poor (Fernandes 2421-32). The typecasting of India’s poor working class as lazy, dependents of government aid, and as threats to civil society is played out in the English-print media’s negative coverage of the working classes struggles; more specifically this can be observed in those outlets that cater to India’s emerging middle class (Fernandes 2421-32). As a result, India’s middle class habitually shares a preordained view in which they believe the poor and working classes are subject to their situations of poverty and furthermore consciously choose to exist in poverty. Many of these prejudiced attitudes directed at the lower classes are also echoed in the community based activist movements of India’s middle class. Rallying around their negative sentiments of the lower class many middle class groups have organized against the government’s willingness to grant slum - dwellers residential rights, who generally would be driven out by the development programs of the state (Das 208). Inter-class conflicts between the middle and lower classes in a historical context is nothing new to India, but it is not coincidence that the same economic policies of liberalization that would have pushed to evict the slum-dwellers have served as a launching pad in giving rise to India’s new middle class. The middle class is mirroring the ideals put forth by a liberalized global economy, because in a liberalizing India they are in a position to benefit greatly.
Conclusion
The Rise of India’s new middle class is something of great interest especially to those entities who wish to capitalize off their commercial consumption. The liberalization of the Indian economy has brought about change to India’s socio-economic landscape at a very quick pace. Globalizations impact on the Indian people has been most evident in the rise of India’s middle class and their purchasing power that has given many people the opportunity to experience the comfortable life that many westerners enjoy. Acculturation of liberalized lifestyle for the most part has smoothly transitioned into Indian society. With pressures from outside forces such as the World Bank, India has made efforts to modernize their cities. The middle class’s demands for modernity too are one of the driving forces that are causing the Indian government and private sector to invest in development. At some point there will need to be efforts both by the Indian government and all those who stand to proper off the middle class that will need to investigate what is necessary for this phenomenon to continue on into the future. Today we see many countries middle class dwindling, so it is imperative for India to consider ways to continue increasing the middle class. With the purpose of sustaining the growth of middle class it is necessary for India to satisfy the needs of this distinctive group while simultaneously meeting the demands for a growing economy. This would entail investing in education and job training to ensure long term growth.
Finally it is important for the Indian government to set in place programs that will also protect those that are not incorporated into this growing section of the nation. For those lucky enough to afford an education and job training the prosperity of joining the middle class is bright, but for those who cannot the likely hood of social mobilization is grim. It is also important that when planning for development that those not included in the middle class are not ignored in their needs. Many of the developmental projects focused toward the middle class often times interrupt the lively hood of those lower classes.
The most striking feature of contemporary India is the rise of a confident new middle class… whether India can deliver the goods depends a great deal on it. – Das (2000)
Tibetan Refugees in India: Problems and Prospects for Future Cooperation
Introduction
India, the largest and most pluralistic democracy in the world, contains a rich diversity of religions, ethnicities and languages. But as India continues to thrive economically it may begin to receive an increase in immigration from neighboring countries. What I intend to examine are the conditions faced by Tibetan refugee populations in India- are the conditions changing? Has Hindu-Indian admiration for the Tibetan people changed? Will tension between India and China affect Tibetan populations in India? All of these questions must be framed by the understanding that diversity in India has been an important characteristic of the state since its independence in 1947. Diversity may be seen as a foundation of Indian society as Gandhi did not think religion should be the defining national characteristic. Rather the national identity is not defined by religion or ethnicity but with faith in democracy (Venturelli). But how will India respond to new migration? Despite the ideals of diversity and a multi-ethnic state, one can perceive tensions increasing based on recent immigration into India from neighboring countries. One group facing the uncertainty of attitude towards recent immigration are Tibetan refugees— refugees who fled Tibet following the fleet of the Dalai Lama in October of 1959. Even as Tibetan refugees immigrated decades ago, their non-Hindu identity may become a factor as xenophobia and immigration concerns rise in India. I hypothesize that because of the role of Buddhism in Tibetan culture, Tibetan refugees are able to continue to experience stable conditions in India without the magnitude of attention given to other migrant groups by Hindu Nationalists.
Currently, there are approximately 101,240 Tibetan refugees residing in India (Central Tibetan Administration). This represents the overwhelming majority of Tibetans in exile. However, the uncertainties facing their legal status, cultural heritage and political rights do not provide Tibetans with explicit security of livelihood (Dorjee and Giles, 2005, p. 151). I have chosen to evaluate the issue of Tibetan refugees using multiple contemporary and historic perspectives— that of the Tibetan refugees, the Indian government and that of the larger issue of immigration in India. Since 1959 Tibetan refugees have migrated to India, with the desire of returning to Tibet. However, their desire has been unfulfilled and a hundred thousand Tibetan refugees have settled in India.
Refugee Status
Tibetan refugees collectively fled Tibet due to the violence and terror that accompanied the Chinese invasion. A unique aspect of the Tibetan migration to India is the collective and national sense that accompanied it. Professor Franz Michael, a contemporary scholar of China analyzes the refugees, “Not as individuals alone, but rather as a national polity that has escaped the destruction taking place in Tibet” (Michael, 1985, p.737). Not only did the refugees move but also transported their institutions away from their homelands and into India. This is a defining characteristic of the Tibetan migration and one that is an important aspect to the health of Tibetans in India today. However, the condition of Tibetan refugees in the Indian legal system remains uncertain.
Quoted as part of a study, Tibetan exile Thubten Dorje perceived his status in India as, “We aren’t Indians, We don’t get benefits. We can’t buy land. There is no citizenship for us” (Falcone and Wangchuck, 2008, p. 167). And while this description may seem to classify Tibetan refugees as second-class citizens, it is not an explicit truth. Even as some Tibetan refugees who were born in India are granted and accept citizenship, many refuse it or are unable to obtain it. One reason is social pressure. There exists social pressure for Tibetans in India to prolong refugee status and refuse Indian citizenship. For Tibetans in India, as opposed to those in the United States, “Have primarily remained stateless, foregoing the practical benefits of citizenship, remaining de facto refugees” (Hess, 2006, p. 80). The hope for a return to a free Tibet is a priority for many Tibetans that may be seen as more important than the pragmatic choice of citizenship and the social services that follow. The principled idealism consistently practiced by Tibetans in India- by not obtaining citizenship- is thought of as promoting the temporary nature of exile. For it is thought that if Tibetans, although not prohibited by the Tibetan Government in exile, obtain Indian citizenship it would be a signal to China and the International community as to the permanency of their migration (Hess, 2006, p. 84). It should be noted that India allows Tibetans a home and a cultural freedom that would not be allowed elsewhere in the region (Central Tibetan Administration).
The relative stability and comfortable conditions experienced by Tibetans in India is unique and should not be overlooked. These conditions may not be consistent with the experiences of Tibetans in China, Nepal and Bhutan. In addition to the limited support provided by the Indian government, the Central Tibetan Administration has established government services and a taxation system. The Tibetans in India occupy relatively small homogenous communities in the North of India, predominately in Dharamsala in the state of Himachal Pradesh but are also based in isolated communities along the Nepalese border. According to Mohammed Fazel,in his study on quality of life for Tibetans-in-exile claims, “The Tibetans-in-exile… continue to be a highly homogenous society in spite of a 30-year sojourn in India” (Fazel, 1988, 239). The isolation of Tibetan communities may contribute to the consistency of the favorable conditions experienced as to not bring attention to the group. However, even as the Tibetans-in-exile remain isolated, the Indian government appears to be engaged in a delicate balance- one of admiration for the Tibetans and one of restraint (Fazel, 1988, 239). While there exists a high level of admiration among Hindu Indians for the Tibetan Buddhists, India risks being seen as challenging China on Tibet- a particularly sensitive issue for the Chinese. While the topic of Indian- Chinese relations regarding Tibet is not the mode of analysis for this paper it is an important issue and one that may become more prevalent in the future. The current relationship between Tibetans-in-exile and the Indian government is cooperative and the organization of social service is shared.
Social Services- A Problem of Citizenship
The India government, specifically an autonomous body under the Ministry of Human Resources, called the Central Tibetan Schools Administration (CTSA) maintains 28 schools in Tibetan concentrated areas (Indian Ministry of Human Resource Development). In addition the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) as the Tibetan Government in Exile is know- manages 49 schools in similar areas. The Indian government’s tax revenues support the CTSA whereas the CTA receives support from its internal Tibetan refugee tax system but also from organizations and individuals sympathetic with the Tibetan people (Indian Ministry of Human Resource Development). One can identify an interesting balance as Tibetan refugees receive social services such as education from multiple sources. Tibetan refugees in India may obtain culturally sensitive education from two sources. The sources, however, represent differing priorities and goals for the refugees (Indian Ministry of Human Resource Development).
While residing in India for decades, the Tibetan refugees seek to maintain their refugee status and many do not accept Indian citizenship (Norbu, 1080). This action prevents the refugees from receiving significant services from the Indian state. This balance as well as the question of citizenship is consistent with the Tibetan refugees’ desire for impermanent institutions and desire to return to Tibet. It also presents Indian policy makers with limited options to support the Tibetan refugees. For if the refugees become citizens they may become a part of the political process and receive official and standard government services (Sperling and McGranahan 162). But this is not desired; instead the Central Tibetan Administration manages the Tibetan communities and preserves the temporary status of Tibetan refugees in India (Central Tibetan Administration). But I hypothesize that the Tibetan refugees’ refusal of most government interaction may have allowed the continuation of India’s friendly stance towards the Tibetan refugees.
Tibetan Refugees and Contemporary Politics
Even as the Tibetan refugee communities in India may not have caused distrust politically, the growing number of refugees and political crises in India may inadvertently affect the long-term sustainability of Tibetan refugees. A study by J. Crush and S. Ramachandran examine trends of immigration and the xenophobic sentiments that accompany migration. Their study focuses on South-to-South migration, or migration of people from one developing state to another, concluding that, “Few destination states in the South believe that in-migration from other developing countries is at all beneficial” (Crush and Ramachandran, 2010, p.209). Even as a Tibetan-in-exile may have been born in India, family born in India and have known no other land, the refugees condition may be threatened by the xenophobic sentiments accompanying mass migration of non-Hindus into India. According to the study cited above and the United Nations, migration to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal has surpassed five million persons and continues to rise. Most importantly, the study concludes that, “cultural affinities, physical proximity and the presence of earlier migrants reinforce this spatial pattern” (Crush and Ramachandran, 2010, p.210-12). But what the report does not ask is, Are Tibetan refugees still considered refugees by the Indian public, and are Tibetan refugees today as associated with current refugees from the countries examined in the U.N. study? Even as most of the Tibetan refugees migrated decades ago the stability and welcome granted to the Tibetan exiles and their government may be reduced in the coming future.
What differentiates the Tibetan refugees from other refugees in India is the admiration that many in India and in the West have for Tibetan culture and of Mahayana Buddhism. Refugees from other states may not have such a luxury and face difficulties and prejudices that may not provide for stability and relative comfort. Furthermore, many Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Nepalese migrate for economic or environmental reasons, and while they may legitimately be called refugees, they are seen more as economic competitors and opportunists, not as admirable migrants. A further cause of distrust is the Muslim religiosity of many immigrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan- a characteristic that contributes to the high levels of distrust between Hindus and the refugees. Reece Jones, in a study on Indian policy during the ‘Global War on Terror’ states that, “India in particular adopted this rhetoric of threat and security to justify, and expand, their own exclusionary practices” (Jones, 2009, p. 291). India’s post-9/11 policy has increased the perception of threat created by refugees, especially Muslim refugees. And this may be appropriately justified, for of the numerous terrorist attacks in India since 2001 many if not most have been planned and implemented by non-Indians, specifically radical fundamentalist Muslims. This is the perspective posed by the West but also by the Hindu nationalist BJP party that was in power from 1998-2004. Therefore, recent refugees and those from alternative religious or cultural systems may lack the cultural connection that exists between Tibetans and Hindu Indians that has allowed for cooperation. Even as the cooperation has been consistent since 1959, there are indicators that the cooperation and connection may be decreasing. Tension and or pressure may create incentives for India to rethink the refugee status given to Tibetan refugees. For example, in October of 2009, prior to meeting Chinese Premier Wen, Indian Prime Minister said, “The Dalai Lama is our honoured guest. He is a religious leader who is not allowed to indulge in political activities” (Sharma, “Hindustan Times”). This example illustrates that even as Tibetans are respected religiously they are viewed with suspicion on politics.
The most significant, and xenophobic claims against immigration in India come from the Hindu nationalist groups, such as the political party- Bharatiya Janata Party who attack groups it considers to be against the Indian state (Gillan, 2002, p. 73-75). My research has dictated that Tibetans have largely avoided this attention but have been subject to it recently. For example, the Karmapa Lama, Ugyen Thinley Dorje- the second most famous Tibetan-in-Exile has been accused by some Indian groups and reported in the media to be a Chinese spy or someone seeking to subvert the Indian state (Bhatt, “Times of India”). This is a claim that the Central Tibetan Administration has vehemently denied, but has sparked concern that Tibetan refugees may come under increased attention due to the people’s historic link to China. While the motivation for the claim and the truth behind it is complex, this is the sort of attention the Tibetan refugees should seek to avoid. It would also be difficult to understand a partnership between a high ranking Tibetan and the Chinese government, as the Tibetan government in exile has not sought to encourage or support the Chinese government in the past and is unlikely that it would do so in the present. The claim stated above may also create a difficult situation for the Indian government who seek to portray power against its neighbors. And a claim that a Tibetan monk is a spy may embarrass Indian leaders and bring attention to the limited services Tibetan refugees receive. The Indian government seeks to avoid controversy or attention regarding the refugees and seeks a continuation of the status quo. The significance of the controversy is that India’s growing suspicion of its neighbors, specifically China and Pakistan, may lead to anti-immigration sentiment amongst Hindu Indians and could affect Tibetan refugees.
Culture and Long-Term Outlook
By focusing on cultural preservation, education and community building, Tibetan refugees in India have been relatively successful in preserving their cultural identity in exile. For his actions of non-violence and attempts to preserve Tibetan culture, the Dalai Lama, or spiritual leader of the Tibetan people was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 (Dorjee and Giles, 2005, p. 141). Worldwide recognition of the Tibetan people and efforts to support the exile in India may have created a niche for Tibetans that may protect them against the rise in xenophobia accompanying the rise in immigration in India (Samphel, 2009, p.63). In addition many Hindu Indians admire the Tibetan culture and religion that is actively being preserved by the Central Tibetan Administration. One reason for the admiration may be the Indian roots of Buddhism and the familiarity that many Hindu Indians have with Buddhist concepts (“Tibetan Buddhism”). The roots of Buddha, as a born Hindu, and creator of Buddhism link Hindu Indians and Tibetan Buddhists in a way that does not exist for Muslim immigrants to India. The role of religion in Tibetan society may be described as, “cultural identity is constructed through Buddhism, which has influenced almost all social and political aspects of Tibetan life” (Dorjee and Giles, 2005, p. 141). I hypothesize that because of the role of Buddhism in Tibetan culture, Tibetan refugees are able to continue to experience stable conditions in India without the magnitude of attention given to other migrant groups by Hindu Nationalist. Another reason may be the respect and attention given to the Tibetan refugees in the West. For example, there exist Tibetan cultural centers in New Delhi, in New York City and around the world. These centers seek to inform citizens of diverse countries about the Tibetan language, Buddhist religion and contemporary situation. Insofar as the centers educate people, they may also serve to strengthen the Tibetan refugees’ situation and allow for positive conditions in India. For other migrant groups are not well represented abroad and do not have similar cultural admiration.
Conclusion
There are many factors that contribute to the conditions experienced by Tibetan refugees in India today. However, the stability of their conditions during the last 52 years may be in jeopardy, as rising xenophobia has followed the rise of immigration in India. Even as the rise in xenophobia may be based on Islamic terrorism, Tibetan refugees may not be immune. For in refusing to stabilize their condition by accepting Indian citizenship In order to prevent unwanted attention from the Indian populace, the Tibetans should seek to avoid the type of attention created by the Karmapa Lama controversy. Simple steps must be taken to build trust with the Indian government and people in order to maintain favorable opinions and policies. But the balance for the Tibetan refugees in India remains difficult- for the ultimate goal is not stability in India, rather it is a return to Tibet- and to a safe and self-governed state. But the idealism of hope must be balanced with the pragmatism of stability. Tibetan refugees must decide whether to remain steadfast in their desire for self-governance and risk stable in India, for it may be unlikely that both exist.