Tibetan Refugees in Contemporary India

Tibetan Refugees in India: Problems and Prospects for Future Cooperation

India, the largest and most pluralistic democracy in the world, contains a rich diversity of religions, ethnicities and languages. Diversity in India has been an important characteristic of the state since its independence in 1947. As a concept, diversity, is widely appreciated and respected, however, one can perceive tensions increasing based on recent immigration into India from neighboring countries. One group facing the uncertainty of attitude towards recent immigration are Tibetan refugees— refugees who fled Tibet following the fleet of the Dalai Lama in October of 1959. Even as Tibetan refugees immigrated decades ago, their non-Hindu identity may become a factor as xenophobia and immigration concerns rise in India. I hypothesize that because of the role of Buddhism in Tibetan culture, Tibetan refugees are able to continue to experience stable conditions in India without the magnitude of attention given to other migrant groups by Hindu Nationalists.

Currently, there are approximately 101,240 Tibetan refugees residing in India (Central Tibetan Administration). This represents the overwhelming majority of Tibetans in exile. However, the uncertainties facing their legal status, cultural heritage and political rights do not provide Tibetans with explicit security of livelihood. I have chosen to evaluate the issue of Tibetan refugees using multiple contemporary and historic perspectives— that of the Tibetan refugees, the Indian government and that of the larger issue of immigration in India. Since 1959 Tibetan refugees have migrated to India, with the desire of returning to Tibet. However, their desire has been unfulfilled and a hundred thousand Tibetan refugees have settled in India.

Tibetan refugees collectively fled Tibet due to the violence and terror that accompanied the Chinese invasion. A unique aspect of the Tibetan migration to India is the collective and national sense that accompanied it. Professor Franz Michael, a contemporary scholar of China analyzes the refugees, “Not as individuals alone, but rather as a national polity that has escaped the destruction taking place in Tibet” (Michael, 1985, p.737). Not only did the refugees move but also transported their institutions away from their homelands and into India. This is a defining characteristic of the Tibetan migration and one that is an important aspect to the health of Tibetans in India today. However, the condition of Tibetan refugees in the Indian legal system remains uncertain.

Quoted as part of a study, Tibetan exile Thubten Dorje perceived his status in India as, “We aren’t Indians, We don’t get benefits. We can’t buy land. There is no citizenship for us” (Falcone and Wangchuck, 2008, p. 167). And while this description may seem to classify Tibetan refugees as second-class citizens, it is not an explicit truth. Even as some Tibetan refugees who were born in India are granted and accept citizenship, many refuse it or are unable to obtain it. One reason is social pressure. There exists social pressure for Tibetans in India to prolong refugee status and refuse Indian citizenship. For Tibetans in India, as opposed to those in the United States, “Have primarily remained stateless, foregoing the practical benefits of citizenship, remaining de facto refugees” (Hess, 2006, p. 80). The hope for a return to a free Tibet is a priority for many Tibetans that may be seen as more important than the pragmatic choice of citizenship and the social services that follow. The principled idealism consistently practiced by Tibetans in India- by not obtaining citizenship- is thought of as promoting the temporary nature of exile. For it is thought that if Tibetans, although not prohibited by the Tibetan Government in exile, obtain Indian citizenship it would be a signal to China and the International community as to the permanency of their migration (Hess, 2006, p. 84). It should be noted that India allows Tibetans a home and a cultural freedom that would not be allowed elsewhere in the region.

The relative stability and comfortable conditions experienced by Tibetans in India is unique and should not be overlooked. These conditions may not be consistent with the experiences of Tibetans in China, Nepal and Bhutan. In addition to the limited support provided by the Indian government, the Central Tibetan Administration has established government services and a taxation system. The Tibetans in India occupy relatively small homogenous communities in the North of India, predominately in Dharamsala in the state of Himachal Pradesh but are also based in isolated communities along the Nepalese border. According to Mohammed Fazel, in his study on quality of life for Tibetans-in-exile claims, “The Tibetans-in-exile… continue to be a highly homogenous society in spite of a 30-year sojourn in India” (Fazel, 1988, 239). The isolation of Tibetan communities may contribute to the consistency of the favorable conditions experienced as to not bring attention to the group. However, even as the Tibetans-in-exile remain isolated, the Indian government appears to be engaged in a delicate balance- one of admiration for the Tibetans and one of restraint. While there exists a high level of admiration among Hindu Indians for the Tibetan Buddhists, India risks being seen as challenging China on Tibet- a particularly sensitive issue for the Chinese. While the topic of Indian- Chinese relations regarding Tibet is not the mode of analysis for this paper it is an important issue and one that may become more prevalent in the future. The current relationship between Tibetans-in-exile and the Indian government is cooperative and the organization of social service is shared.

The India government, specifically an autonomous body under the Ministry of Human Resources, called the Central Tibetan Schools Administration (CTSA) maintains 28 schools in Tibetan concentrated areas (Central Tibetan Schools Administration). In addition the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) as the Tibetan Government in Exile is know- manages 49 schools in similar areas. The Indian government’s tax revenues support the CTSA whereas the CTA receives support from its internal Tibetan refugee tax system but also from organizations and individuals sympathetic with the Tibetan people. One can identify an interesting balance as Tibetan refugees receive social services such as education from multiple sources. Tibetan refuges in India may obtain culturally sensitive education from two sources. The sources, however, represent differing priorities and goals for the refugees.

While residing in India for decades, the Tibetan refugees seek to maintain their refugee status and many do not accept Indian citizenship. This action prevents the refugees from receiving significant services from the Indian state. This balance as well as the question of citizenship is consistent with the Tibetan refugees’ desire for impermanent institutions and desire to return to Tibet. It also presents Indian policy makers with limited options to support the Tibetan refugees. For if the refugees become citizens they may become a part of the political process and receive official and standard government services. But this is not desired; instead the Central Tibetan Administration manages the Tibetan communities and preserves the temporary status of Tibetan refugees in India. But the desire to remain refugees in India and Tibetan refusal of some government interaction may have allowed the continuation of India’s friendly stance towards the Tibetan refugees.

Even as the Tibetan refugee communities in India may not have caused distrust politically, the growing number of refugees and political crises in India may inadvertently affect the long-term sustainability of Tibetan refugees. A study by J. Crush and S. Ramachandran examine trends of immigration and the xenophobic sentiments that accompany migration. Their study focuses on South-to-South migration, or migration of people from one developing state to another, concluding that, “Few destination states in the South believe that in-migration from other developing countries is at all beneficial” (Crush and Ramachandran, 2010, p.209). Even as a Tibetan-in-exile may have been born in India, family born in India and have known no other land, the refugees condition may be threatened by the xenophobic sentiments accompanying mass migration of non-Hindus into India. According to the study cited above and the United Nations, migration to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal has surpassed five million persons and continues to rise. Most importantly, the study concludes that, “cultural affinities, physical proximity and the presence of earlier migrants reinforce this spatial pattern” (Crush and Ramachandran, 2010, p.210-12). The question that one must then ask is, ‘Are Tibetan refugees still considered refugees, and are they as a group associated with present day refugees?’ If the answer to the question is yes, the stability and welcome granted to the Tibetan exiles and their government may be reduced in the coming future.

What differentiates the Tibetan refugees from other refugees in India is the admiration that many in India and in the West have for Tibetan culture and of Mahayana Buddhism. Refugees from other states may not have such a luxury and face difficulties and prejudices that may not provide for stability and relative comfort. Furthermore, many Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Nepalese migrate for economic or environmental reasons, and while they may legitimately be called refugees, they are seen more as economic competitors and opportunists, not as admirable migrants. A further cause of distrust is the Muslim religiosity of many immigrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan- a characteristic that contributes to the high levels of distrust between Hindus and the refugees. Reece Jones, in a study on Indian policy during the ‘Global War on Terror’ states that, “India in particular adopted this rhetoric of threat and security to justify, and expand, their own exclusionary practices” (Jones, 2009, p. 291). India’s post-9/11 policy has increased the perception of threat created by refugees, especially Muslim refugees. And this may be appropriately justified, for of the numerous terrorist attacks in India since 2001 many if not most have been planned and implemented by non-Indians, specifically radical fundamentalist Muslims. This is the perspective posed by the West but also by the Hindu nationalist BJP party that was in power from 1998-2004. Therefore, recent refugees and those from alternative religious or cultural systems may lack the cultural connection that exists between Tibetans and Hindu Indians that has allowed for cooperation. Even as the cooperation has been consistent since 1959, there are indicators that the cooperation and connection may be decreasing.

The most significant, and xenophobic claims against immigration in India come from the Hindu nationalist groups, such as the political party- Bharatiya Janata Party who attack groups it considers to be against the Indian state (Gillan, 2002, p. 73-75). My research has dictated that Tibetans have largely avoided this attention but have been subject to it recently. For example, the Karmapa Lama, Ugyen Thinley Dorje- the second most famous Tibetan-in-Exile has been accused by some Indian groups and reported in the media to be a Chinese spy or someone seeking to subvert the Indian state (Bhatt). This is a claim that the Central Tibetan Administration has vehemently denied, but has sparked concern that Tibetan refugees may come under increased attention due to the people’s historic link to China. While the motivation for the claim and the truth behind it is complex, this is the sort of attention the Tibetan refugees should seek to avoid. It would also be difficult to understand a partnership between a high ranking Tibetan and the Chinese government, as the Tibetan government in exile has not sought to encourage or support the Chinese government in the past and is unlikely that it would do so in the present. The claim stated above may also create a difficult situation for the Indian government who seek to portray power against its neighbors. And a claim that a Tibetan monk is a spy may embarrass Indian leaders and bring attention to the limited services Tibetan refugees receive. The Indian government seeks to avoid controversy or attention regarding the refugees and seeks a continuation of the status quo. The significance of the controversy is that India’s growing suspicion of its neighbors, specifically China and Pakistan, may lead to anti-immigration sentiment amongst Hindu Indians and could affect Tibetan refugees.

By focusing on cultural preservation, education and community building, Tibetan refugees in India have been relatively successful in preserving their cultural identity in exile. For his actions of non-violence and attempts to preserve Tibetan culture, the Dalai Lama, or spiritual leader of the Tibetan people was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 (Dorjee and Giles, 2005, p. 141). Worldwide recognition of the Tibetan people and efforts to support the exile in India may have created a niche for Tibetans that may protect them against the rise in xenophobia accompanying the rise in immigration in India (Samphel, 2009, p.63). In addition many Hindu Indians admire the Tibetan culture and religion that is actively being preserved by the Central Tibetan Administration. One reason for the admiration may be the Indian roots of Buddhism and the familiarity that many Hindu Indians have with Buddhist concepts (“Tibetan Buddhism”). The roots of Buddha, as a born Hindu, and creator of Buddhism link Hindu Indians and Tibetan Buddhists in a way that does not exist for Muslim immigrants to India. The role of religion in Tibetan society may be described as, “cultural identity is constructed through Buddhism, which has influenced almost all social and political aspects of Tibetan life” (Dorjee and Giles, 2005, p. 141). I hypothesize that because of the role of Buddhism in Tibetan culture, Tibetan refugees are able to continue to experience stable conditions in India without the magnitude of attention given to other migrant groups by Hindu Nationalist. Another reason may be the respect and attention given to the Tibetan refugees in the West. For example, there exist Tibetan cultural centers in New Delhi, in New York City and around the world. These centers seek to inform citizens of diverse countries about the Tibetan language, Buddhist religion and contemporary situation. Insofar as the centers educate people, they may also serve to strengthen the Tibetan refugees’ situation and allow for positive conditions in India. For other migrant groups are not well represented abroad and do not have similar cultural admiration.

There are many factors that contribute to the conditions experienced by Tibetan refugees in India today. However, the stability of their conditions during the last 52 years may be in jeopardy, as rising xenophobia has followed the rise of immigration in India. Tibetan refugees have refused to stabilize their condition by accepting Indian citizenship and instead hope for what the future will bring. And while Tibetans may not have had this problem in the past, the continuation of Tibetan refugee status in India may provide ammunition for anti-immigration groups in India to suspect mal-intent from the refugees. In order to prevent unwanted attention from the Indian populace, the Tibetans should seek to avoid the type of attention created by the Karmapa Lama controversy. Simple steps must be taken to build trust with the Indian government and people in order to maintain favorable opinions and policies. But the balance for the Tibetan refugees in India remains difficult. For the ultimate goal is not stability in India, rather it is a return to Tibet- and to a safe and self-governed state. But the idealism of hope must be balanced with the pragmatism of stability. Tibetan refugees must decide whether to remain steadfast in their desire for self-governance and risk stable in India, for it may be unlikely that both exist.

Works Cited

Bhatt, Jagdish. "Karmapa Suspected to Have Chinese Links: Himachal Police." Times of

India. 4 Feb. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2011. .

“Central Tibetan Administration” http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php

Dorjee, Tenzin, and Howard Giles. "Cultural Identity in Tibetan Diasporas." Journal of

Multilingual & Multicultural Development 26.2 (2005): 138-157.

Falcone, Jessica, and Tsering Wangchuk. ""We're Not Home": Tibetan Refugees in India

in the Twenty-First Century." India Review 7.3 (2008): 164-99. Worldwide Political Science Abstracts. Web. 24 Feb. 2011.

Fazel, Mohammed K., and David M. Young. "Life Quality of Tibetans and Hindus: A

Function of Religion." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 27.2 (1988): 229.

Gillan, Michael. "Refugees or Infiltrators? The Bharatiya Janata Party and

“Illegal”Migration from Bangladesh." Asian Studies Review 26.1 (2002): 73-96.

Hess, Julia Meredith. "Statelessness and the State: Tibetans, Citizenship, and Nationalist

Activism in a Transnational World." International Migration 44.1 (2006): 79-103.

Jones, Reece. "Geopolitical boundary narratives, the global war on terror and border

Fencing in India." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 34.3 (2009): 290-304.

McGranahan, Carole, and Elliot Sperling. "Introduction: Tibet, India, and China." India

Review 7.3 (2008): 161-3. Worldwide Political Science Abstracts. Web. 24 Feb.

2011.

Norbu, Dawa. "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality." Asian

Survey 37.12 (1997): 1078-. Worldwide Political Science Abstracts. Web. 24 Feb. 2011.

Samphel, Thubten. "Maintaining Vitality in Exile." Harvard International Review 31.3

(2009): 60-63.

Sangay, Lobsang. "Tibet: Exiles' Journey." Journal of Democracy 14.3 (2003): 119-30.

Crush, Jonathan, and Sujata Ramachandran. "Xenophobia, International Migration and Development." Journal of Human Development & Capabilities 11.2 (2010): 209-228.

Singh, Sinderpal. "“Border Crossings and Islamic Terrorists”: Representing Bangladesh

in Indian Foreign Policy During the BJP Era." India Review 8.2 (2009): 144-162.

"Tibetan Buddhism." Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition (2010): 1-2.